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Abstract
Design methodologies devote a great degree of eﬀort on deciphering, decomposing, and simplifying problems. This approach is particularly true
in Axiomatic Design to the point that inability to simplify and understand a situation is deﬁned as complexity. The approach with Axiomatic
Design is to avoid complexity because complexity is assumed to make a reliable solution intractable. What if an unreliable situation is needed?
This paper explores the concept of “desirable complexity”, an application of Suh’s complexity for ﬁelds which want to create problems or
challenges rather than eliminating them: puzzles, sabotage, physical security, and unique identiﬁcation. In these areas, inverting AD complexity
theory gives suggestions to making duplication and solution discovery challenging by creating seemingly unsolvable problems.
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
Peer-review under responsibility of the scientiﬁc committee of The 10th International Conference on Axiomatic Design.
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1. Introduction
The core of any design is meeting the customer’s needs. This
is the traditional wisdom used in the majority of design method-
ologies in practice. The methodologies such as Axiomatic De-
sign [1], TRIZ [2], and Design Thinking [3] all devote signif-
icant eﬀort to deciphering, decomposing, and simplifying ele-
ments based upon customer needs. There is an underlying as-
sumption here that is worth considering: all parties involved
have a collaborative attitude. In this work, we discuss a num-
ber of cases which break this assumption: one of the parties
has an antagonistic relationship with the designer. In this case,
traditional design methodologies as written are often unable to
provide concrete guidelines of how to proceed.
When existing tools are insuﬃcient to meet a need, oppor-
tunities arise1. Slocum [6, page 3-16] suggests using a mental
tool called Critical Thinking: Maxwell’s Reciprocity Theorem
in such a situation: If the current tool does the opposite of what
you want, why not try reversing how you operate it? This sug-
gestion is directly applicable to the invalid assumption that we
always want a design to succeed. We propose the approach of
following the basic approach of Axiomatic Design and Com-
1“In confusion, there is proﬁt!” Milo Minderbinder (Jon Voight) in the
movie adaption [4] of Catch-22 [5]
plexity theory [7], then actively investigating the opposite of
what these methodologies suggest as “good design practice”.
Bragason et al. [8] previously explored what can be learned by
exploring “improper” application of AD theory by translating
expert Customer Needs (CN) directly into Functional Require-
ments (FR). The result was a coupled design in which so-called
customer needs were stated, that were actually constraints, and
then stated as FRs.
1.1. Axiomatic Design and Complexity
Axiomatic Design [1] was developed with the main purpose
of understanding the relationship between conceptual require-
ments (Functional Requirements) and the details of implemen-
tation (Design Parameters). This idea is represented in the form
of a transfer function in a matrix as shown in Equation 1.
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The ﬁrst axiom leads to deﬁning solutions that have only a
one-to-one relationship between the functional domain and the
physical domain of design Ai j as the best. The second axiom
states that a design with the minimum information content has
the highest probability of success of the system operating range
achieving the design-speciﬁcation FRs. Thus, a design is said to
have the least information content and is the most robust when
having the design range/capability of the design is completely
within the system range speciﬁed by the designer. For example,
a designer may specify that bar stock be cut to a tolerance of
±0.05mm. If a hack saw is used as the physical solution, its
design range/capability is ±1.5mm, which results in very high
information content. It is very unlikely (but not impossible) that
the bar will be cut within the desired tolerance. Robustness can
also be increased by minimizing the absolute value (gain) of
each Ai j value as long as the gain stays above “noise.” [7, page
37]. The most robust solution has the highest chance of success.
Suh deﬁnes complexity as, “A measure of uncertainty in under-
standing what it is we want to know or in achieving a functional
requirement (FR)” [7]. When information content cannot be
kept small (or nonexistent), this condition is described as com-
plexity [7].
Suh deﬁnes four categories of complexity:
Real is due to the inability of the chosen implementation to
meet the requirements under all speciﬁed conditions.
Imaginary results from a path dependency of FR satisfaction
that is not obvious to users, because the design of interest
is partially coupled.
Combinatorial results when the system range changes with
time because of time-dependent error inputs or system
degradation.
Periodic occurs when a system needs to be “reset” regularly in
order to be able to meet its requirements.
Much of the recent Axiomatic Design literature focuses on
how to reduce [9,10], manage [11], or measure [12] complexity
in a way to compensate for it. Puik and Ceglarek [13] map com-
plexity to knowledge in order to use the Cyneﬁn Framework as
guidance in how to explore a solution space in the correct cate-
gory of unknown unknowns.
To understand why we may “want to fail” or to have a design
that is complex leads to the need for solutions requiring self-
organization in the face of complexity. Human beings may have
been designed to address the seemingly abnormal relationship
of “antagonism” in which unreliable solutions are preferred to
reliable solutions.
Our knowledge about system design and systems engineer-
ing is evolving. Axiomatic design may be considered as
one viewpoint within a system architecture description as de-
ﬁned by the relatively new (2011) ISO/IEC/IEEE 42010 stan-
dard [14] as shown in Fig. 1. One precept of Axiomatic design
is to develop stable and reliable designs.
Yet, there are many other viewpoints that may be used to
complete the picture of an architecture description. In com-
puter science, Modular Dependency Diagrams and ﬂowcharts
are often used to describe the interaction of data and the under-
lying processing. These tools are used to ﬁnd loops and sources
of unreliability in the ﬂow of data and of program execution. In
all of the systems methods mentioned, reliability is enhanced
NOTE 1 The figure uses the conventions for class diagrams defined in [ISO/IEC 19501]. 
Fig. 1. Conceptual Model of an Architecture Description
by simplifying and minimizing the number of elements. If this
is not what is desired, then any method such as inverting AD
theory may be desirable because it will have the opposite ef-
fect.
2. Antagonistic Relationships
This initial exploration into assumptions can be found in [15]
which discussed using Axiomatic Design to ﬁnd assumptions
to be exploited in security system bypassing. Designing secu-
rity systems is quite challenging because security systems have
Functional Requirements that focus on not having something
occur: prevent theft, obscure private documents, contain sus-
pect, etc. Such “negative FRs” are extremely hard to test; com-
prehensive analysis of all possible conditions is often not possi-
ble resulting in nearly guaranteed uncertainty. Security design-
ers instead focus on limiting exposure of sensitive elements lo-
cally at the expense of the big picture. To best understand this
mindset, we have to ﬁrst consider the most basic of antagonistic
relationships — puzzles.
2.1. Puzzles
Traditionally complexity is focused on tolerances in the
physical realm, unless Suh’s deﬁnition is applied. A typical
application of “negative FRs” starts with the challenge of de-
signing a puzzle.
The academic study of puzzles is deﬁned as “enigmatology,”
an appropriate term coined by Will Shorts who received the ﬁrst
degree in the ﬁeld [16]. The construction of a suitable puzzle,
particularly crosswords, involves understanding the constraints
of each possible answer. Consider the following cases for a
word puzzle:
Unconstrained: Write a word here:
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Lightly-constrained: Write a four-letter word in the box:
2
Medium-constrained: Write a four-letter word ending
“UCK”:
3
U C K
Fully-constrained: Write a four-letter word of a waterfowl
ending with “UCK”:
3
U C K
Over-constrained: Write a four-letter English word that
rhymes with “orange”
4
Though allowing for great creativity, many people would
ﬁnd the Unconstrained case unsatisfying. Dissatisfaction is of-
ten due to the inability to verify the “correct” answer2. As the
level of constraint becomes stronger, it becomes easier to val-
idate the correct answer but harder to ﬁnd it. Going beyond
a certain point results in an unsolvable situation. Consider-
ing this case with AD terminology, the Unconstrained case has
zero information content and should be the best. The Fully-
constrained case has large information content and the Over-
constrained case, inﬁnite information content. What is going
on here?
Another very popular puzzle is the Rubik’s cube. This puz-
zle may be represented as a heavily coupled system. Each turn
of a face results in changing the arrangement of 21 elements.
There are 4.3252 × 1019 diﬀerent states and with advanced
computer-based strategies any combination can be solved in 18
moves [18]. This ﬁnding illustrates imaginary complexity as
it is a system that is low in information content and extremely
path dependent. Without fully understanding how the sides are
connected and modiﬁed with each operation, it is extremely un-
likely that the correct solution will be found. This puzzle has
an obvious success case when the colors on the sides match.
Again, AD says that this is a complex design, but it is extremely
popular because of the unknown path dependency/imaginary
complexity. Apparently, the user wants to be challenged by
something that seems diﬃcult. We can now treat the terms “dif-
ﬁcult” and “complex” as synonyms in this light.
2.2. Resistance to change
Combinatorial complexity is sometimes desired in manufac-
turing environments where people are rewarded with overtime
for missing a week’s production. The people may change in-
puts to the system about number of products made, inventory
on hand, etc. that cause the design to fail intentionally, leading
to desirable complexity. This is directly in line with what AD
suggests about making projects be on time: reduce the coupling
in FRs [19]. This situation arises due to the simple nature of in-
compatible motivations: personal gain is in direct conﬂict with
the eﬃciency of the company.
2Though in vary rare cases, dissatisfaction may be the desired result! Penn
and Teller’s Desert Bus video game was intended to be bad [17].
3. Applied Complexity
With the knowledge that complexity allows us to design
tasks that are diﬃcult or to seemingly seek failure, a new ap-
plication arises, “how does one protect valuable assets and sys-
tems?” The owner of important assets would like to maintain
that possession, something easily stated as an FR, but very hard
to verify. Unfortunately, the “negative FR” needed to specify
that someone should not be able to take the object away is eas-
ier to test, but is not good AD standard practice. Instead we
need to focus on the diﬃculty of the system e.g. complexity of
acquisition of assets
3.1. Physical Security
As with the previous puzzle example, we will consider an
increasingly constrained system which will make it more com-
plex and non-intuitively, seemingly better.
Unconstrained: asset sitting on the ground
Lightly constrained: asset under a cloth
Medium constrained: asset in a heavy safe
Heavily constrained: asset in a heavy safe, buried under-
ground in a pyramid on a secret place in the world, all
engineers and people with knowledge of asset buried in
the pyramid.
Overconstrained: asset does not exist, owner pretends that it
is inside the safe3
Considered from the perspective of complexity in AD, the
diﬃculty to surpass a safety mechanism may be traced back
to the knowledge that is required to understand the situation.
This knowledge is addressed by the Axioms; the Independence
Axiom addresses knowledge that is related to the conceptual
status of the problem, and the Information Axiom addresses the
knowledge to execute the tasks needed to satisfy the FRs under
all circumstances. This codiﬁcation may also be referred to re-
spectively ‘doing the right things’ and ‘doing things right’ [21].
However, this case is aiming for the reversed eﬀect; instead of
solving problems we are looking for ways to make things diﬃ-
cult. Therefore, good AD practice is reversed into respectively:
‘make it diﬃcult to do the right things’ and ‘make it diﬃcult to
do things right’. Fig. 2 shows a ‘Maturity Diagram’ [22] that
plots satisfaction of the axioms as a product design evolves. The
ideal endpoint of the design would normally be the upper right
corner in which a design may be considered mature. A mature
product complies willingly with the requirements of any user
as it is a very regulated situation. Safe and secure systems are
adversely found at the lower left corner where it is very diﬃ-
cult to determine actions to circumvent the system and, if the
actions were known, it is extremely diﬃcult to execute them.
This is clariﬁed by an asset under a camouﬂage cloth; it is bet-
ter protected than the asset under a red cloth because it is more
diﬃcult to spot. More extreme, opening a safe with a known
construction would need some operational skills, but additional
3The character Xaro Xhoan Daxos did exactly this in the TV adaptation of
Game of Thrones [20].
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Fig. 2. Axiomatic analysis of Physical Security examples
conceptual knowledge is needed to open a safe with unknown
construction. More operational excellence would be needed to
dig a pyramid out of the ground and even more conceptual un-
derstanding is required to deduct its place somewhere in the
world, especially with all people knowing about that place are
buried in the pyramid.
This extreme example aside, just considering the safe’s pro-
tection mechanism alone is still related to coupling and com-
plexity. Knowledge in the form of conceptual understanding
and operational excellence is needed to unlock it. A combina-
tion lock is a common interface to a safe. Standard safes (not
embedded into a building) are rated by the Underwriter’s Lab-
oratory for their resistance to burglary ranging from TL-15 to
TXTL-60. The highest rating (TXTL-60) must be able to with-
stand an attack with common mechanical and electrical tools,
cutting torches, and high explosives for at least 60 minutes [23].
Depending upon the attacker, it may be acceptable to damage
the lock and safe. In other cases, particularly with intelligence
gathering, it is important that the protection mechanism not be
tampered with.
Regardless of these considerations, a basic combination lock
is by design a path-dependent mechanism to reduce the chances
of success via Imaginary Complexity (Fig. 3, left). Knowledge
of the right order of rotations to the correct locations instantly
eliminates the complexity. Safe-crackers employ a number of
tools in order to reduce this complexity. For older, purely-
mechanical combination locks, the use of a ruler attached to
the handle for disengaging the latch provides valuable insight
into the inner workings of the safe during manipulation. By
watching how the handle moves as the dial is spun, the exact
location of the combination can be determined (Fig. 3, left).
Where the safe is allowed to be modiﬁed, a much simpler
method has been employed by one of the author’s colleagues: a
carbide tipped drill. A hole was carefully drilled into the side of
a safe near where the combination dial was located. By look-
ing through the hole, it was quite clear when the slots in the
disks behind the combination dial were moving. Again, com-
plexity and information were reduced by gaining knowledge of
the inner workings of the safe.
Higher-end safes have tried to eliminate traditional manipu-
lation by ingeniously designed disks and clutch mechanisms.
Newer electro-mechanical dial mechanisms have no kinetic
connections to the lock mechanism at all. In an AD context,
the design goal is to decouple the user from the mechanism so
that there is no ability for knowledge to be transmitted through
a coupled or partially coupled design.
A similar approach has been applied against the drill
method; extremely high security safes contain a glass “locker-
plate” which is connected to high-tension springs. If the locker-
plate is broken through the use of a drill, an independent set of
locking mechanisms engages. This approach reduces chance of
success by preventing the the attacker from reducing informa-
tion content via drilling (Fig. 3, left).
An additional barrier is added in embedded safes through the
use of time locks. These locks have an internal clock which en-
sures that the safe can be only opened during those times. Not
having the ability to try numerous codes when the the safe is
blocked by the time lock increases the diﬃculty to gain knowl-
edge of the safe which increases time-dependent complexity in
gaining access clandestinely.
Finally, in the most extreme case of an attacker using shaped
charged high explosives to open a safe, it is extremely hard to
resist. In these cases, AD and best practice have the same sug-
gestion: make the asset value coupled to the state of the con-
tainer. The asset should be destroyed or equivalently unusable
if signiﬁcant force is used in retrieval.
3.2. Unique Identiﬁcation
Similar to the these asset protection methods, there are many
cases where a designer would like to identify a speciﬁc entity
uniquely. This problem shows resemblance with the combi-
nation locks. Knowing a code satisﬁes the identiﬁcation. By
combining mechanical and electronic solutions, such as the one
discussed below, the quality of identiﬁcation may be further en-
hanced.
Modern manufacturing methods for Integrated Circuits (IC)
have spent great eﬀorts to generate consistent line widths on mi-
crochips. The basic limits of precision ensure that this is an ef-
fort that will never end until manufacturers are able and willing
to do such mass manufacturing on an atom-by-atom basis. Un-
til that point occurs, there will always be some variation in the
resistance, capacitance, or gate-performance of IC-level tran-
sistors. If we are trying to get perfectly consistent performance,
we are certainly in the area of complexity due to information.
As before, if we apply the general concept of “Desirable
Complexity” we can take advantage of these inconsistencies
to generate unique identiﬁcation as in the Physically Unclon-
able Function (PUF) described in [24,25] (Fig. 3, left). Fo-
ley [26] describes a PUF-based method of developing an end-
to-end RFID privacy and security solution. A PUF makes use
of these manufacturing irregularities and ampliﬁes them to cre-
ate a unique ID that no other IC will have when made this way.
Such a system is extremely resistant to duplication because it
takes advantage of the limits of VLSI manufacturing technol-
ogy’s repeatability and turns them into a beneﬁt. Replicating
these extremely tiny geometries to replicate such a system is
both ﬁnancially and technologically unfeasible, while making
them is not.
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Fig. 3. Axiomatic analysis of three typical cases of systems with desired complexity; Simple Sabotage, Unique identiﬁcation, and Manufacturing examples
3.3. Sabotage and Terrorism
One highly motivated antagonistic group in the same vein
as “Black Hat” hackers is intelligence agencies and saboteurs.
These groups are looking for weaknesses in systems to ex-
ploit [15]. A key diﬀerence between what most people would
regard as a “terrorist” rather than a “saboteur” is the concern of
being caught: a terrorist may not care once the mission is com-
plete (Fig. 3, middle). Intelligence agencies spend a great deal
of eﬀort creating human “assets” to support missions. It should
be obvious that a reusable asset is generally worth more in the
long run so it is of great interest that the asset not get caught nor
killed. It is best if these “citizen-saboteurs” seem to just doing
their normal work.
Sabotage varies from highly technical coup de
main acts that required detailed planning and the use
of specially trained operatives, to innumerable simple
acts which the ordinary individual citizen-saboteur
can perform. This paper is primarily concerned with
the latter type. Simple sabotage does not require spe-
cially prepared tools or equipment; it is executed by
an ordinary citizen who may or may not act individ-
ually and without the necessity for active connection
with an organized group; and it is carried out in such
a way as to involve a minimum danger of injury, de-
tection, and reprisal [27].
The need for sabotage during World War 2 motivated the
Oﬃce of Strategic Services to produce a ﬁeld guide for sabo-
teurs [27]. One thing is immediately striking: many of the or-
ganizational sabotage suggestions would be considered almost
standard practice in today’s larger and overly-complicated busi-
ness world [28]. As a practitioner in Axiomatic Design and
Complexity Theory, something becomes even more striking:
many suggestions are explicitly increasing coupling or infor-
mation content:
This type of activity, sometimes referred to as the
“human element” is frequently responsible for acci-
dents, delays, and general obstructions even under
normal conditions. The potential saboteur should
discover what types of faulty decisions and non-
cooperation are normally found in his kind of work
and should then devise his sabotage so as to enlarge
that “margin for error.” [27] (Fig. 3, middle).
Having made this intuitive leap, it becomes clear that look-
ing for sources of coupling as in [15] or to create new sources
of complexity is a viable strategy for sabotage. With respect to
complexity and its impact, the guide is very clear.
3.4. Manufacturing
Desirable complexity occurs when an entity in a manufac-
turing system optimizes itself at the expense of the whole as
described in Section 2.2. For example, a steering gear manu-
facturing plant could not produce the right quantity and mix of
products on time for their customers. The result of this system
failure was that production personnel were paid time-and-a-half
overtime on the weekends to catch back up to schedule. Produc-
tion personnel achieved their FR of increasing their personnel
wealth at the expense of system complexity. To accomplish
their objective, production personnel would make it diﬃcult to
do things right by sabotaging and/or not properly maintaining
machines (Fig. 3, right). Likewise, production personnel would
make it diﬃcult for others to do the right thing by hiding inven-
tory or providing inventory counts that would cause the master
scheduler to produce the wrong product. Complexity was de-
sired by production personnel because they were direct beneﬁ-
ciaries of the system failure and waste that they caused.
An Electronic Engine Controllers (EEC) plant’s Operations
research group, thought it desirable in order to maximize out-
put to switch to another available machine rather than to ﬁx a
machine when it went down (Fig. 4). This policy about opera-
Fig. 4. Electronic Engine Controller manufacturing ﬂow diagram
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tions resulted in ﬂow complexity. Any top side SMD placement
machine could feed any bottom side SMD placement machine
through any combination of ﬂow paths. If top side SMD3 ma-
chine went down, for instance, then the operating policy was to
run top side SMD4 machine instead of correcting the problem
with SMD3. This approach institutionalized ﬂow complexity
by not taking the proper actions to repair a machine immedi-
ately in the event that it goes down.
Flow complexity is an issue because it is diﬃcult to track
root cause of a problem due to coupling of the processes. The
irony is that the system design was based on an unrealistic con-
straint. . . to run the machines all of the time. Yet, the operating
policy was to let a machine go down and to switch to another
machine. . . which resulted in excessive downtime and uncon-
trolled inventory levels between machines represented by the
Work In Process (WIP) tombstones illustrated in Fig. 4. This
constraint is in contrast to a true FR of producing the customer-
required quantity every shift. In the same way that the axioms
both should be satisﬁed to realize a good design, satisfaction
may be reversed to make something secure, and, while doing
this, both axioms serve a diﬀerent purpose.
3.5. Findings on the Reversed Application of Axiomatic Design
In the same way that AD is applied to investigate how FRs
are satisﬁed by a decoupled set of DPs, its methods may also
be applied to investigate how a system can be designed to re-
frain from satisfying its FRs. The Complexity Theory gives ex-
tremely helpful suggestions about how to secure, lock, identify,
or sabotage systems and how to do this very subtly by merely
increasing coupling or deceasing robustness. The maturity dia-
gram may be helpful to visualize the information in the design
and how the axioms are aﬀected during this process.
4. Conclusion
It is not often the case that complexity is desirable. Most
systems should be robust; designers want their products to suc-
ceed and be able to be manufactured in quantity. The need and
desire for complexity comes when there is an antagonistic rela-
tionship between the entities involved in a system. In this case,
“negative FRs” are eﬀectively created which are most easily
addressed by optimizing to increase coupling or information to
discriminate against the antagonistic entity.
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